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CHAPTER 31 
THE ETHICS PROBLEM 
Toward a Second-Best Solution 
to the Problem of Economic Expertise 
DAVID M. LEVY AND SANDRA J. PEART 
INTRODUCTION 
WHILE it is in the interest of society to obtain disinterested advice from experts, there 
may be strong private incentives for any one expert to provide biased advice. This is 
the collective action problem associated with expertise. In recognition of this problem, 
the American Economic Association (AEA) has recently implemented new publica-
tion guidelines (AEA, 2012) that ask for disclosure of financial rewards associated with 
research conducted by economists. On the occasion of a discussion of these new AEA 
publication guidelines (AEA, 2012) we ask whether they are sufficient to overcome the 
barrier to disinterested economic research and advice. We suggest that the guidelines 
are insufficient to solve the collective action problem associated with advice-giving and 
we sketch out a potential remedy to our continued concerns. 
We approach the problem from the point of view of the consumer of expert advice. In 
a world of transparency, the sensible rule would be to trust experts. We'd make the same 
decision as they recommend had we spent our resources on obtaining their knowl-
edge. However, when transparency fails that trust can be a catastrophe. We propose to 
think in terms of the general theory of the second-best in which we accept the existence 
of constraints that cannot be removed (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956-57). In this world 
transparency is a pipedream, but what is possible is to make that non transparency itself 
transparent. A code of ethics for experts might suggest to nonexperts that there is temp-
tation to violate professional standards for private ends. Thus, the very existence of an 
ethical code is a warning. To serve this end the code of ethics needs to indicate where the 
dangers lie, what tempts the experts. 
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In what follows we review early discussions of the collective action problem associ-
ated with giving advice. Frank Knight's discussion of economic experts is particularly 
valuable because he held a view of governance by truth-seekers but he also realized that 
such governance wasn't incentive-compatible. Instead of falling into Knight's pessimism 
we take this view as a first-best situation and ask what constraint blocks the solution. 
Given that constraint, we can then think about a second-best solution. 
We begin with Knight's important insights into "the reasons why economists write 
books and articles:' Knight recognized, first, that economists should apply their 
models to themselves, thereby explicitly modeling researchers and advice-givers 
as self-interested. Second, he was acutely aware of the collective action problem in 
which the "competition for recognition and influence take the place of the effort to get 
things straight" (Knight, 1933: xxvii). Knight's sometimes intellectual opponent, A. C. 
Pigou, made the similar point that instead of seeking the truth, individual economists 
who are unconstrained by ethics simply posture and argue. The third section locates 
the Knightian enterprise in a first-best world in which governance is conducted as 
truth-seeking. Knight's truth-seeking view of governance is explicitly presupposed in 
John Rawls's magisterial Theory of Justice. The Knight-Rawls connection is even clearer 
when one examines Rawls' annotations to Knight's Ethics of Competition. The first-best 
supposition of truth-seeking can fail when economists act as advocates for predeter-
mined systems of belief. The fourth section moves to econometrics and the problem 
of nontransparent specification search, an issue first raised by Rutledge Vining when 
he asked the Knightian question where is the econometrician in the econometrician's 
model. In the fifth section we suggest why the Knight-Rawls' notion of government 
with ethics, which is to say government by (fair) discussion, is fragile and we offer a sug-
gestion to help better align private and public incentives in the arena of giving advice 
by making the nontransparent pursuit of private ends itself transparent. We close with 
a proposed addition to the AEA guidelines to help deal with the motivated economist. 
THE EXPERT ECONOMIST'S DILEMMA, 
HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED 
We know of two important treatments of the collective action problem from the early 
20th century. The first was offered by Knight in the 1933 "Preface to the Re-Issue" of Risk, 
Uncertainty and Profit in the London School of Economics reprints series of "Scarce 
Tracts:' A. C. Pigou offered a second treatment a year later in his London School of 
Economics lecture in which he flamboyantly described the issue.1 
1 Perhaps Knight and Pigou were inspired by considering what follows from failure of the 
motivational condition that J:Neville Keynes put forward when he described positive economics as the 
search for Jaw. (We put the motivational condition in bold.) "We mean by a law a theorem, the statement 
of a uniformity, not a command enforced by sanctions. The Jaw of supply and demand, the Ricardian law 
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Knight and Pigou are often correctly seen in oppositional terms. Knight's response 
to Pigou's road problem is rightly celebrated as the beginning of the London School of 
Economics (LSE)-Chicago analysis of the critical rule of property rights in a competi-
tive economy (Pigou, 1918; Knight, 1924; Coase, 1993; Heckman, 1997). As Coase tells us, 
he selected the title of his most famous article, "The Problem of Social Cost;' in tribute 
to Knight's "Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost" (Coase, 1993: 250). But Knight 
and Pigou also share an important insight into the economics of economists as experts. 
Just as they hold that the individuals studied by economists confront collective action 
problems, so too do the economists themselves face these problems. This makes for a 
motivational homogeneity between theorist and theorized, something we take as foun-
dational in analytical egalitarianism. 
Frank Knight 
Knight begins his "Preface" by proposing to address what needs to be done to develop 
and improve received economic doctrine (Knight, 1933: xi). Although there are very 
few specific targets of his preface-Pigou's treatment of uncertainty in an appen-
dix of Economics of Welfare (xiv) and the confounding of firm and plant (xxi) are 
exceptions-his unhappiness with the larger classical enterprise is quite clear and not 
especially surprising given his other writings of the period. 
What is a surprise comes in his two-paragraph exercise in the economics of econom-
ics. In the first of these he proposes to use the tools of economics to analyze the econo-
mist's own activity: 
The first and main suggestion, looking towards a more relevant economics, is that 
the inquiry into motives might well, like charity, begin at home, with a glance at the 
reasons why economists write books and articles. These things are also commodi-
ties, produced competitively for a market, ... , the behaviour of economists provides 
evidence regarding the possibilities of settling questions-and of settling them 
rightly-by free discussion. (xxvi) 
Then Knight describes the collective action problem in which "Economics finds itself 
in a vicious circle": 
To get recognition and have influence it descends to the public's level of thinking; 
then competition for recognition and influence take the place of the effort to get 
things straight; finally, success in this competition becomes the condition of mem-
bership in the profession itself. It is no doubt idle to say, now, that there "might 
of rent, Gresham's law, and the like, may be given as examples of economic laws in the above sense. The 
validity of such laws is a purely theoretical question, and our attitude towards them is not, nor at any 
rate should not be, affected by our ethical or political views" Keynes (1891: 36). Keynes continues and 
describes such activity as advocacy. 
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have been'' an economics profession made up of minds exclusively devoted to the 
problem-solving interest and working co-operatively at this task, instead of more 
and more hawking their wares competitively to the public by way of settling their 
"scientific" differences. (xxvii-xxviii) 
Knight's statement of the problem and his own solution to it were taken up by 
William Hutt in his 1936 Economists and the Public but they were otherwise largely 
ignored. 
A. C. Pigou 
Lecturing at the London School of Economics in late 1934 on the role of economists in 
society, A. C. Pigou comes to the matter of controversy. Those who thought he might 
respond to Knight's criticism were in for a surprise, as Pigou actually sharpened Knight's 
point. While "controversy up to a point serves, no doubt, to stimulate and clarify 
thought;' Pigou argued that "controversy for its own sake is a prodigious waste of time" 
(Pigou, [1935] 1936: 22). He then quoted a verse from Rudyard Kipling without explana-
tion: "There are nine and sixty ways of constructing tribal lays, I And every single one of 
them is right!" 
Those in the audience who could place the verse in Kipling's poetic sketch of the hesi-
tant steps away from a world of wars ("Neolithic Age") might have foreseen some of 
what followed. Pigou pointed to a rule that J. M. Keynes urged on the occasion of the 
official obituary notice for Alfred Marshall: 
It is not politic for us to lay down even the most general rules for one another: we 
may so soon be constrained to break those rules ourselves. Not so long ago one of my 
most distinguished colleagues urged his fellow-economists to "eschew the Treatise, 
pluck the day, fling pamphlets into the wind:' A few years later he himself offered, 
and we gratefully received, a work with the title of Treatise and comprising two 
weighty tomes!2 
After offering a defense of Marshall's generosity to the classics, Pigou clarified the 
point of the verse: 
And there is yet another thing. Are we, in our secret hearts, wholly satisfied with the 
manner, or manners, in which some of our controversies are carried on? A year or 
two ago, after the publication of an important book, there appeared an elaborate and 
careful critique of a number of particular passages in it. The author's answer was, not 
to rebut the criticisms, but to attack with violence another book, which the critic had 
himself written several years before! Body-line bowling! The method of the duello! 
([1935], 1936: 23-24) 
2 Pigou, [1935] 1936: 22-23. 
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The episode, now cited as witness to the decade-spanning dispute between Keynes 
and F. A. Hayek, is for Pigou an instance of the failure of economists to attain their col-
lective goal as they understand it3: 
That kind of thing is surely a mistake. It is a mistake, not merely in general and in the 
abstract, but also for a solid reason of State. Economists in this country lack the influ-
ence which-in their own opinion-they ought to have, largely because the public 
believe that on all topics they are hopelessly divided. Controversies conducted in the 
manner of Kilkenny cats do not help to dissipate this opinion. And yet in truth the 
opinion is largely mistaken! ([1935], 1936: 24) 
For Pigou, group influence depends upon unanimity but individual self-interest 
unconstrained by ethics leads to posturing and dissent. This was especially true in the 
arena of policy advice. Pigou described the demand for economic advice: 
... political partisans, I say, are accustomed to decide what they want to do first and to 
seek for arguments in favour of it afterwards. Economic reasoning is for them, not a 
means of arriving at the truth, but a kind of brickbat useful on occasions for inflicting 
injury on their opponents. ([1935], 1936: 8-9) 
He continues with a story about an unnamed political figure who switched economic 
advice as policy changed and then another about his adventures in offering advice in 
the letters column of the Times. He moved from being in the judgment of the Prime 
Minister, "the great Cambridge economist" to a "mere academic theorist" in a twinkling 
of a policy shift! ( [1935], 1936: 9-10 ). Then he reviews the private incentives facing econ-
omists to gain influence through the sale of their theories for the sake of policy results: 
Of course to students of detached mind this kind of thing is entertaining and quite 
harmless. But to a young man the ambition to play a part in great affairs is natural: and 
the temptation to make slight adjustments in his economic view, so that it shall con-
form to the policy of one political party or another, may be severe. As a conservative 
economist or a liberal economist or a labour economist he has much more chance of 
standing near the centre of action than he has as an economist without adjectives. But 
for the student to yield to that temptation is an intellectual crime. It is to sell his birth-
right in the household of truth for a mess of political pottage. ( [1935], 1936: 10-11) 
The only solution that Pigou proposed is what Kipling saw, a norm of toleration and 
awareness, from which it followed that the public would be skeptical of advice. Two 
stanzas provide a context to the lines quoted above: 
Then I stripped them, scalp from skull, and my hunting-dogs fed full, 
And their teeth I threaded neatly on a thong; 
3 F. A. Hayek (1994: 47) quotes the passage as evidence of Keynes's reaction to the review of Treatise of 
Money. Bruce Caldwell offers an extensive discussion (1995: 26). 
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And I wiped my mouth and said, "It is well that they are dead, 
For I know my work is right and theirs was wrong:' 
But my Totem saw the shame; from his ridgepole-shrine he came, 
And he told me in a vision of the night:-
"There are nine and sixty ways of constructing tribal lays, 
And every single one of them is right!"4 
GOVERNMENT BY TRUTH-SEEKING 
AS FIRST-BEST 
John Rawls depended upon Knight at the critical moment in which the question arose 
as to whether legislative discussion is aimed at discovering the correct answer or sim-
ply working out a compromise. Rawls then provided a framework to think about the 
fair conduct of those who are concerned with discovering the correct answer but who 
are aware that they and others have other motivations. Knight's view of governance is 
that it ought to be, but rarely is, an objective exercise to find the best solution to social 
problems. Governance for Knight is not about trading interests. It is instead a discussion 
about how best to obtain agreed-upon ends. In Justice Rawls is completely clear that his 
understanding oflegislation was Knightian. 
Government by discussion involves majority rule and decision making by experts. 
We quote the long passage in which Rawls takes legislation in a just constitution as a 
procedure to arrive at the "best policy as defined by the principles of justice": 
In the ideal procedure, the decision reached is not a compromise, a bargain struck 
between opposing parties trying to advance their ends. The legislative discussion 
must be conceived not as a contest between interests, but as an attempt to find the 
best policy as defined by the principles of justice. I suppose, then, as part of the the-
ory of justice, that an impartial legislator's only desire is to make the correct decision 
in this regard, given the general facts known to him. He is to vote solely according to 
his judgment. The outcome of the vote gives an estimate of what is most in line with 
the conception of justice. 
If we ask how likely it is that the majority opinion will be correct, it is evident that 
the ideal procedure bears a certain analogy to the statistical problem of pooling the 
views of a group of experts to arrive at a best judgment. ((1971], 1999, 314). 
4 It perhaps intrigued readers, and certainly struck us as worthy of note that both Knight's and 
Pigou's reflections offered in the space of a year on the collective action problem of economists have 
an LSE address. Whether this is purely coincidental or not, there is an LSE tradition of the 1903s that 
considers the role of the economist in the economy that we find in William Beveridge's "Mock Trial of the 
Economists" (Levy and Peart, 2011a) and in William Hutt (1936). 
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Rawls's footnote reveals the complexity of the issue. After the citation to K. J. Arrow's 
Social Choice comes the reference to the critical argument in Knight: "For the notion 
oflegislative discu sion as an objective inquiry and not a contest between interests, see 
F. H. Knight, The Ethics of Competition (New York: Harper and Brothers, i935), pp. 296, 
345-347. In both cases see the footnotes." 
The pages cited in Justice are marked for attention in Rawls's index in the rear inner 
lining of his copy of Ethics of Competition. These passages are from Knight's 1934 paper 
on nationalism which has been (unfortunately) read in isolation from the introduction 
to the LSE reprint except perhaps by W. H Hutt (1936). A small part of the index Rawls 
prepared for Ethics is reproduced in Figure 31.1. 
The pages Rawls cites are also reproduced below. Rawls's use of red ink is apparently 
a mark of emphasis. He seems particularly taken by Knight's response to a skeptic who 
denies there is a "best" answer. 
Knight dearly worried that discussion aimed at discovering the correct answer can 
degenerate into pursuit of one's interests. His proposed solution to the problem of par-
tial interest corrupting the discussion of social goals was to appeal to fairness. The role of 
agreement is very subtly worked into Knight's argument. The background assumption 
in footnote 1 (345) is an appeal to impartiality (Figures 31.2 and 3i.3). 
We see in the extensive footnote to which Rawls paid close attention the doctrine that 
"expression of personal preferences is not discussion and indeed leads definitely toward 
conflict." 
Knight famously worried that growing income inequality would corrupt government 
by discussion becau e those with more dollars would have a louder voice. The problem 
of interest-the individualization of ends-does not go away when we leave the govern-
ment of a commercial society and move to the government of a philosophical one. 
Knight's answer is precisely the same in philosophical discussions as it is in the gov-
ernment of a competitive order. The player, as Knight puts it, must be more concerned 
to have a good game, to play by agreed upon rules, than to win. The question as we see 
it is whether this is sufficient to ensure the discussion is "fair:' Our worry, expounded in 
more detail in the fifth section, is that without a more expansive code of ethics, enforced 
by spectators who are aware of the nontransparency of advice, experts will be insuffi-
cientlywedded to a norm of fair play to take part willingly in a competitive discussion, to 
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PlGURE 3u A section ofRawls's index to Knight's Ethics of Competition. 
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FIGURE 31.2 Rawls's marking of Knight's Ethics of Competition, p. 345. 
FIGURE 31.3 Rawls's marking of Knight's Ethics of Competition, p. 346. 
play by the rules and to abide by the outcome. Knight sees this too and despairs (Figures 
31.4 and 31.5). 
VINING EXPLAINS KNIGHT 
Readers of Knight owe a great debt to Vining for a stream of publications in which 
Knightian themes were expounded (Vining, i949, 1950, 1956). Vining's stress on the 
ethical obligations of researchers was particularly important in these publications. We 
begin with the 1949 exchange with Tjalling Koopmans, in which Vining defended the 
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National Bureau ofEconomic Research (NBER) practice as "hypothesis seeking," some-
thing we might now call "exploratory data analysis" (Vining, 1949: 78). There Vining 
asked Koopmans to consider the econometrician's motivations in Koopmans's research 
program. If the econometrician was considered to be outside the chain of cause and 
effect then perhaps, Vining argued, we need to appeal to the sort of Kantian moral moti-
vation that Knight presupposed (81). In his response Koopmans accepted "hypothesis 
seeking" as an open problem to be addressed by future technical developments.5 
For our purposes the most helpful of Vining's statements is found in his 1956 pam-
phlet for UNESCO, Economics in the United States. Tue pamphlet speaks to the relation-
ship between choice and individual obligation. Vining opens his section "The individual 
obligation implicit in the idea of individual freedom" with a statement familiar to 
Knight's reader , that one is ethically bound not to advocate in one's own interests: 
One can never propose an alteration in an economic system on the explicit grounds 
that he will gain personally from the alteration-at least he can never do so with ariy 
hope that he will be listened to. The proposal must be made on the grounds that the 
result will be generally more satisfying or else that what now exists is unfair. (1956: t8 
[emphasis added]) 
5 Koopmans (1949: 90 ): "This touches on unsolved problems at the very foundations of statistical 
theory, and I must confess that l do not see clearly through the is ues involved. It is possible to take a 
formal view and argue that hypothesis-seeking and hypothesis-testing differ only in how wide a set of 
alternatives is taken into consideration." 
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We return later to the possibility of dropping "explicit" and pursuing personal inter-
est, whether pecuniary or ideological, in a nontransparent manner. Vining's argument 
of course raises a puzzle concerning the sources of the ethical obligation: 
How is it that we say that social criticism in order to be valid must necessarily be 
devoid of personal motive? And how is it that the individuals constituting the society 
may feel a binding obligation to pursue the process until consensus is reached and to 
conform to the rules and constraints which are the outcome of the process? That is, 
what is the source of the obligation that may be felt by each member of the society to 
abide by the laws established by the group? (1956: 18) 
The solution, Vining argues, comes from the very concept of "a free and rational indi-
vidual;' an explicit Kantian imperative (1956: 19 ). 
The econometric literature moved on with rare backwards glances, two of which 
are of considerable importance. While in his 1972 ]EL review article of Koopman's life 
work, Edmond Malinvaud regarded Vining as the "definite loser" as judged by profes-
sional acceptance (1972: 801), and he emphasized the "interesting distinction" between 
hypothesis seeking and the practice defended by Koopmans (Malinvaud, 1972: 801). 
Second, at the 5oth anniversary of Cowles in 1983 Malinvaud began a serious reconsid-
eration: "Notwithstanding this undisputable success of the probability approach, some 
of R. Vining's doubts have been recently echoed within the econometric literature. Some 
have argued that current econometric practice is often weak at the specification stage:' 
(Malinvaud, [1983] 1988: 207). (Malinvaud cited the work of E. Leamer (1978), C. Sims 
(1980 ), and referred to the work of exploratory data analysis in mathematical statistics 
ofJ. Tukey.) 
1983, the year that marked the 5oth anniversary of the Cowles Commission, also saw 
the publication of Learner's "Let's Take the Con Out of Econometrics" (Leamer, 1983) 
that developed the unhappy consequences of the hypothesis-seeking behavior Vining 
had laid out as a problem for Koopmans and his associates. Since then, 30 years of 
econometric work on specification search suggests that economists and other experts 
are indeed motivated by something other than truth itself (Leamer, 1983; Feigenbaum 
and Levy, 1996; Levy and Peart, 2007, 2008). 
TOWARD A SOLUTION TO THE ETHICAL 
DILEMMAS OF EXPERTISE 
We need to recognize that the problem of expert advice is more than just a worry about 
financial incentives; we take seriously Adam Smith's worries about the dangers of sys-
tem (Levy and Peart, 2013). If we combine Smith with Knight and Rawls, the "objective 
inquiry" or the "best policy" may only be contingent upon a system. This would be akin 
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to how Buchanan reads Knight (Buchanan, 1967) except that instead of preferences for 
policies we have preferences for a system. 
"Best" answers that are far from the best are often the consequence of a false system. 
System-specific answers of course will generally be local to issues. Thus, if the system 
was a eugenic system in which the great "dangers" were race suicide and inherited crimi-
nality, a "best" policy might be the sterilization of the "unfit:' If the system was a view of 
comparative growth of the American and the Soviet economy in which Soviet overtak-
ing was a near-certainty, the "best" policy might be an early war against North Vietnam, 
a Soviet client state, as a way to prevent a later war against an "increasingly powerful" 
Soviet Union.6 
It is common knowledge that Knight and Rawls worried about income going to those 
with extraordinary inherited abilities. For Knight, income inequality changes the rules 
of government by discussion; those with more income obtain a louder voice. Knight's 
concerns with bias via inequality is largely a question of transparency. He worried that 
the arguments advanced by interested parties could not be checked by their opponents. 
And because the bias in the system is nontransparent, regular people would not come to 
the conclusion that the discussion was unfair.7 Consequently, the question of how the 
system is selected requires our attention. 
The Knightian vision of a fair game in which all the players are tempted by their sev-
eral goals to cheat poses the question of what makes playing the game of greater impor-
tance than winning one round. What induces experts to propose their best attempt 
at the correct answer instead of their best attempt at an answer that maximizes their 
several individual interests? There is, as we have argued previously, no easy answer to 
this question. But given individual and social interests so rarely fully align, knowing the 
question is one step, perhaps, toward a second best solution. As we argued elsewhere, 
experts function best when they are not fully trusted (Levy and Peart, 2010a ). 
A Rawlsian potential solution now presents itself. Suppose the experts put themselves 
behind a veil of ignorance in which their future clients are unknown. Why would they 
do this? Perhaps if the consumers of expertise know the tricks of argumentation (of 
expertise), it is harder for experts to impose a trick upon them (Levy and Peart, 2010b). 
But this would make the readers into experts of a sort. Making the nontransparency 
itself transparent is our second-best answer. 
When economists act as expert witness in a case for monetary damages in tri-
als before juries, the nontransparency of economic advocacy is itself transparent. It is 
6 As illustration of the fragility with respect to false systems in the Knight-Rawls approach to politics, 
we can do no better than to notice that Rawls himself toyed with eugenic concerns (Rawls, [1971], 1999, 
92-93) and Barry's important commentary asks whether we are willing to trade liberty for the higher 
growth and the more abundant future for the sort of direction provided by the Soviet Union (Barry, 
1973: 73-74). 
7 This is not to say that inequality concerns go away in our approach. Rather, they come to us in 
system specific fashion. In the eugenic era, poor girls were sterilized; in the Vietnam War, poor boys were 
drafted. 
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entirely implausible to presume that the jury members know what underlies the econo-
metric models that are presented by the contending experts engaged by the opposing 
parties. Legal institutions have been developed so that presentations by experts are 
tightly constrained. The legal rules of discovery that mandate data and program sharing, 
along with sanctions for fraud, help ensure that the opposing estimates are replicable. 
Everyone involved in the procedure understands that the advocates will offer biased 
estimates but there will be contending experts. Thus, such a simple rule as splitting the 
difference offers a coherent way to reduce the bias (Froeb and Kobayashi, 1996; Posner, 
1999). A modest change in procedure, introducing a statistical variation on final offer 
arbitration, would attenuate the incentives to offer biased testimony and thus help atten-
uate the economist's dilemma that Knight and Pigou described (Levy and Peart, 2008). 
All these nice properties depend on the transparency of nontransparency. No one 
believes the jury will become expert so steps are taken to overcome their limitation. To 
reform economic advocacy we need to take the hardest step of all-to recognize, with 
Knight and Pigou, that we share motivation structure with those we study (Peart and 
Levy, 2003, 2005). The consequence of this is that we really need to put the economist in 
her model. 
The dust has yet to settle on the consequences of the data error in the collection 
compiled by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff so we await a consensus judgment 
(Cowen, 2013). What does come as a surprise is that sophisticated spectators were sur-
prised by the reported difficulties in obtaining data with which to do the statistical anal-
ysis. 8 Systematic data-sharing problems were reported in the economic literature at least 
since the 1986 study by William Dewald, Jerry Thursby, and Richard Anderson (1986). 
It came as a shock that the editors of the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking tried and 
often failed to get data from the authors who published in their journal! If the non trans-
parency of expert advice were itself transparent then we would simply ignore those who 
advocate policies without sharing their data. 
CONCLUSION 
The AEA ethics guidelines ask for disclosures of financial temptations to bias. This 
is surely a significant improvement over no disclosure. The temptation to bend one's 
results in favor of a client who financially supports the research is now perhaps an 
uncontroversial concern.9 Our concern, however, is that there are other private reasons 
8 According to reporter who corresponded with the student who discovered the error (Weisenthal 
2013) the raw data were published on the web but it wasn't until the spreadsheet, which wasn't publically 
available, came that the problem was discovered. 
9 The fact, however, that financial disclosure has only recently entered the economics discourse while 
there has long been a code of ethics in statistics (Levy and Peart, 2008) suggests that there has been rather 
more resistance to admitting that private interests might dash with the public interest in economics than 
other disciplines. 
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for bias. An advice giver might, for instance, have a nonmonetary ("sympathetic") con-
nection with the advice seeker. Or, a researcher might hold with a particular "system'' 
as Adam Smith put it. In today's parlance he or she might have ideological attachments 
or policy commitments, or commitments to governing principles for society. The com-
mitment to "social justice" or "classical liberalism:' for example, might influence an 
economist's model specification or choice of estimation technique which of course in 
turn yield specific conclusions in favor of the presupposed (but hidden) commitment. 
This is not to suggest that economists should refrain from having commitments-the 
impossible-but instead to maintain that the commitments themselves might constitute 
relevant information as the results (or advice) become public, are published in a journal 
or are otherwise dispersed to a more general audience. We suggest that such sympa-
thetic connections will be revealed best by detailing the history of one's work, including 
not least one's consulting history, the policy positions one has advocated in consulting 
and academic work. 
Economists have, indeed, occasionally recognized that they have enormous influence 
in the business of persuasion, which can entail diverse forms of reward. Paul Samuelson's 
remark about the rewards associated with making his conclusions widely known speaks 
directly to the potential for influence and the nonmonetary reward that accrues from 
writing textbooks: "Let those who will, write the nation's laws ifl can write its textbooks" 
(quoted in Colander and Landreth, 1996: 28 ). For those whose expertise is prized, influ-
ence is gained by giving highly regarded advice. If the advice is regarded as ill-informed 
or wrong, then the expert loses face or influence. Thus the expert will be asymmetri-
cally motivated to accept confirming evidence and reject contradictory evidence. There 
is consequently a certain stickiness of models with respect to falsifying evidence. We 
have documented this stickiness in the context of the leading textbook comparisons, 
including that of Samuelson, of Soviet and American growth after 1960 (Levy and Peart, 
2011b).10 
Interestingly, our concern about the nonmonetary connections between those who 
give and receive advice was shared by Ronald Coase. In 1968 Coase was accused of yield-
ing to the sort ofinfluence addressed in the AEA guidelines, of advocating for the Zenith 
Corporation as a result of financial incentives or being a hired advocate for Zenith. 
Coase responded with a letter that flatly denied that there was any monetary connection 
between himself and Zenith. But he then went on to recognize the second reason for 
bias we have identified, that of nonmonetary rewards that accrue from obtaining influ-
ence. Coase's letter suggested that many false arguments are circulated as a means to an 
end, advancing the "public interest:' as he put it (Coase, 1968). 
The foregoing has focused on two issues associated with the ethics of giving advice, 
problems that arise when there are nonmonetary incentives to bias one's advice, and 
10 In the context of a close examination of the methodology of economics, Blaug (1980) concludes that 
economists' empirical research "is like playing tennis with the net down: instead of attempting to refute 
testable predictions, modem economists all too frequently are satisfied to demonstrate tliat the real 
world conforms to their predictions ... " (256). 
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those that arise when the expert has a commitment to particular principles or policy 
stances. We find these to be more intriguing and perhaps more difficult to deal with 
than simple financial incentives. First, it is likely the case that these nonmonetary 
inducements to bias are more pervasive than are financial ones; second, it may be 
harder to detect bias associated with prior ideological commitments. Here we find 
Pigou and Coase in agreement that the temptation especially occurs in the giving of 
advice, in public service. We propose in conclusion not that advisors should remain 
neutral with respect to their advisees but rather that they render more fully transparent 
non-monetary inducements to select evidence and estimation techniques. We propose 
an addendum to the AEA disclosure policy: 
The authors should describe their consulting history in sufficient detail so that the 
reader can infer sympathetic connections. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
A conversation with James Buchanan helped us realize the importance of Rutledge 
Vining's methodological work for our project. We thank Eric Schliesser and Ross 
Emmett for comments on earlier versions and Jane Perry for careful proofreading. The 
mistakes that remain are our responsibility. In accord with the AEA requirements we 
assert that we have neither asked for nor received financial payment of any sort for the 
work reported in the paper. Nor, in accord with our concerns, do we have any history 
of paid consulting about econometric or statistical ethics. We do have a long history 




Coase, Ronald. 2968. Letter to Dean Edward G. Barrett. William ]. Baroody Collection, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box n. 
Knight, Frank. [1935] 1951. Ethics of Competition. New York: Augustus Kelly. With John Rawls's 
Annotations. 
Public Holdings 
American Economics Association. 2012. American Economic Association adopts extensions 
to principles for author disclosure of conflict of interest. http://www.aeaweb.org/PDF _files/ 
PRJAEA_Adopts_Extensions_to_Principles_for_Author_Disclosure_o1-05-12.pdf. 
THE ETHICS PROBLEM 649 
Barry, Brian. 1973· The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the Principle 
Doctrines in Theory of Justice by John Rawls. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Blaug, Mark. 1980. The Methodology of Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Buchanan, James M. 1967. "Politics and Science: Reflections on Knight's Critique of Polanyi:' 
Ethics 77: 303-310. 
Caldwell, Bruce. 1995· Introduction. In F. A. Hayek, Contra Keynes and Cambridge: Essays, 
Correspondence, edited by Bruce Caldwell, pp. 1-48. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Coase, Ronald H. 1960. "The Problem of Social Cost:' Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44. 
Coase, Ronald H. 1993. "Law and Economics at Chicago:' Journal of Law and Economics 
36: 239-254. 
Colander, David C., and Henry Landreth, eds. 1996. The Coming of Keynesian ism to America: 
Conversations with the Founders of Keynesian Economics. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Cowen, 'fyler. 2013. ''.An Update on the Reinhart Rogoff Critique and Some Observations~ Marginal 
Revolution. http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/ 2013/ 04/ an-update- on-the-
reinhart-and-rogoff-critique-and-some-observations.html 
Dewald, William G., Thursby, Jerry G., and Anderson, Richard G. 1986. "Replication in 
Empirical Economics: The Journal of Money, Credit and Banking Project:' The American 
Economic Review 76: 587-603. 
Feigenbaum, Susan, and Levy, David M. 1996. "The Technological Obsolescence of Scientific 
Fraud:' Rationality and Society 8: 261-276. 
Froeb, Luke M., and Kobayashi, Bruce H. 1996. "Naive, Biased, Yet Bayesian: Can Juries 
Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence?" The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 
12: 257-276. 
Hayek, F. A. 1994· Hayek on Hayek: An Autobiographical Dialogue, edited by Stephen Kresge 
and Leif Wenar. London: Routledge. 
Heckman, James J. 1997. "The Intellectual Roots of the Law and Economics Movement." Law 
and History Review 15: 327-332. 
Hutt, William H. 1936. Economists and the Public. London: Jonathan Cape. 
Keynes, J. Neville. 1891. The Scope and Method of Political Economy. London and 
New York: Macmillan. 
Kipling, Rudyard. 1895. "Neolithic Age:' http://www.kipling.org.uk/poems_neolithic.htm 
Knight, Frank H. 1924. "Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost:' Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 38 (4): 582-606. 
Knight, Frank H. 1933· "Preface to the Re-Issue:' In Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. 
London: London School ofEconomics and Political Science. 
Koopmans, Tjalling. 1949· "Methodological Issues in Quantitative Economics: A Reply:' 
Review of Economics and Statistics 31: 86-91. 
Leamer, Edward S. 1978. Specification Searches-Ad Hoc Inferences with Nonexperimental Data. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Leamer. Edward S. 1983. "Let's Take the Con out of Econometrics:' The American Economic 
Review 71: 33-41. 
Levy, David M., and Peart, Sandra J. 2008. "Inducing Greater Transparency: Towards 
the Establishment of Ethical Rules in Econometrics:' Eastern Economic Journal 
34: 103-114. 
Levy, David M., and Peart, Sandra J. 201oa. "Prudence with Biased Experts: Rating Agencies 
and Regulators:' http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=1681609. 
650 DAVID M. LEVY AND SANDRA J. PEART 
Levy, David M., and Peart, Sandra J. 201ob. "Richard Whately and the Gospel of Transparency." 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology 69: 166-187. 
Levy, David M., and Peart, Sandra J. 201ia. "The Mock Trial of the Economists." http://jepson. 
richmond.edu/conferences/adam-smith/paper11levy-peart.pdf 
Levy, David M., and Peart, Sandra J. 2011b. "Soviet Growth and American Textbooks: An 
Endogenous Past." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 76: 110-125. 
Levy, David M., and Peart, Sandra J. 2013. "Adam Smith on the State: Language and Reform:' 
Oxford Handbook on Adam Smith, edited by Christopher J. Berry, Maria Paganelli, and Craig 
Smith, pp. 372-392. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lipsey, R. G., and Lancaster, Kevin. 1956-57. "The General Theory of Second Best. The Review 
of Economic Studies 24: 11-32. 
Malinvaud, Edmond. 1972. "The Scientific Papers ofTjalling C. Koopmans: A Review Article." 
Journal of Economic Literature 10: 798-802. 
Malinvaud, Edmond. (1983] 1988. "Econometric Methodology at the Cowles Commission: Rise 
and Maturity' [Address to the 5oth Anniversary Cowles Celebration: 1983]. Econometric 
Theory 4: 187-209. 
Peart, Sandra J., and Levy, David M. 2003. "Denying Human Homogeneity: Eugenics and the 
Making of Post-classical Economics:' Journal of the History of Economic Thought 25: 261-288. 
Peart, Sandra J., and Levy, David M. 2005. The "Vanity of the Philosopher": From Equality to 
Hierarchy in Post-Classical Economics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Pigou, Arthur C. 1918. The Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan. 
Pigou, Arthur C. (1935] 1936. Economics in Practice. London: Macmillan. 
Pigou, A. C. 1953. Alfred Marshall and Current Thought. London: Macmillan. 
Posner, Richard A. 1999. 'i\n Economic Approach to Legal Evidence." Stanford Law Review 
51: 1477-1546. 
Rawls, John. (1971] 1999. A Theory of Justice. Revised edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Sims, C. A.1980. "Macroeconomics and Reality." Econometrica 48: 1-48. 
Vining, Rutledge. 1949. "Methodological Issues in Quantitative Economics:' Review of 
Economics and Statistics 31: 77-86. 
Vining, Rutledge. 1950. "Methodological Issues in Quantitative Economics: Variations on a 
Theme by F. H. Knight." The American Economic Review 40: 267-284. 
Vining, Rutledge. 1956. Economics in the United States of America. Paris: UNESCO. 
Vining, Rutledge. 1984. On Appraising the Performance of an Economic System: What an 
Economic System Is, and the Norms Implied in Observers' Adverse Reactions to the Outcome of 
Its Working. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Weisenthal, Joe. May 26, 2013. "The Grad Student Who Busted Reinhart and Rogoff Explains 
How Open They Really Were with their Data:• Business Insider. http://www.businessinsider. 
com/thomas-herndon-on-reinhart-and-rogoffs-data-availability-2013-5. 
